

# The Ethanol-subsidy Multiplier

## TheoryGuru applied to Chicago Price Theory

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### Setup

Load Economicreasoning package only if it is not already loaded

```
In[ ]:= If[Length@Names["PLTools`*"] < 10,  
Get["http://economicreasoning.com"]]
```

#### Proof & Logic Tools 6.3

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Type ERCommands for a list of commands in the package.

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### Essentials

$x$  is the subsidy for corn used in ethanol

```
In[ ]:= Equilibrium = eth[p - x] + feed[p] == s[p];
```

```
In[ ]:= d[p_] = eth[p - x] + feed[p];
```

```
In[ ]:= InvSupply = p == c'[s[p]];
```

```
In[ ]:= signconditions = {eth'[p - x] < 0, feed'[p] ≤ 0, s'[p] ≥ 0,  
x ≥ 0, eth[p - x] > 0, feed[p] > 0, s[p] > 0};
```

### Shorthand notation defined

```
In[ ]:= subsidyamt = eth[p - x] x (* subsidized quantity × subsidy rate *);
```

```
In[ ]:= farmersurplus = s[p] p - c[s[p]];
```

```
In[ ]:= inelasticsupply = s'[p] == 0;
```

$$\begin{aligned} \text{In[*]:= } qweight &= \frac{\text{eth}[p - x]}{d[p]}; \\ \text{In[*]:= } \text{elasweight} &= \frac{\text{eth}'[p - x] / \text{eth}[p - x]}{d'[p] / d[p]}; \\ \text{In[*]:= } \text{incidenceparam} &= \frac{d'[p]}{d'[p] - s'[p]}; \\ \text{In[*]:= } \text{elascond} &= \frac{\text{feed}'[p]}{\text{feed}[p]} - \frac{d'[p]}{d[p]} > \frac{\text{eth}[p - x]}{\text{feed}[p]} \frac{s'[p]}{s[p]}; \\ \text{In[*]:= } \text{elasconds0} &= \frac{\text{eth}'[p - x]}{\text{eth}[p - x]} < \frac{\text{feed}'[p]}{\text{feed}[p]}; \\ \text{In[*]:= } \text{elasgap} &= \frac{\text{feed}'[p]}{\text{feed}[p]} - \frac{\text{eth}'[p - x]}{\text{eth}[p - x]}; \end{aligned}$$

## Results in the neighborhood of no subsidy

### Any supply slope

$$\text{In[*]:= } \text{TheoryGuru}\left[\left\{\frac{d\text{Equilibrium}}{dx}, \text{Equilibrium, InvSupply, signconditions, } x = 0, \text{elascond}\right\}, \frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} > \frac{d\text{subsidyamt}}{dx} > 0\right]$$

Out[\*]= True

$$\text{In[*]:= } \text{TheoryOverlap}\left[\left\{\frac{d\text{Equilibrium}}{dx}, \text{Equilibrium, InvSupply, signconditions, } x = 0\right\}, \text{elascond}, \frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} > \frac{d\text{subsidyamt}}{dx}\right]$$

$$\left\{ \frac{\text{feed}'(p)}{\text{feed}(p)} - \frac{\text{eth}'(p-x) + \text{feed}'(p)}{\text{eth}(p-x) + \text{feed}(p)} > \frac{\text{eth}(p-x) s'(p)}{\text{feed}(p) s(p)}, \right. \quad \text{are equivalent}$$

$$\text{Out[*]= } \left. -s'(p) \frac{dp}{dx} c'(s(p)) + p s'(p) \frac{dp}{dx} + s(p) \frac{dp}{dx} > x \left( \frac{dp}{dx} - 1 \right) \text{eth}'(p-x) + \text{eth}(p-x) \right\}$$

$$\text{In[*]:= } \text{TheoryGuru}\left[\left\{\frac{d\text{Equilibrium}}{dx}, \text{Equilibrium, signconditions, } x = 0, \text{elascond}\right\}, \frac{dp}{dx} = qweight \text{elasweight incidenceparam}\right]$$

Out[\*]= True

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru [
  {  $\frac{d\text{Equilibrium}}{dx}$ , Equilibrium, InvSupply, signconditions, inelasticsupply, x == 0 },
   $\frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} == s[p] \frac{dp}{dx}$  &&
   $\frac{d\text{subsidyamt}}{dx} == s[p] \text{qweight}$  ]
```

Out[ ]:= True

i.e., it is a comparison between pass-through rate and quantity weight, which amounts to a comparison of the elasticity weight and the incidence parameter

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru [ {  $\frac{d\text{Equilibrium}}{dx}$ , Equilibrium, InvSupply, signconditions, x == 0 },
  SameSign [  $\frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} - \frac{d\text{subsidyamt}}{dx}$ ,  $\frac{dp}{dx} - \text{qweight}$  ] &&
  SameSign [  $\frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} - \frac{d\text{subsidyamt}}{dx}$ ,  $\text{elasweight incidenceparam} - 1$  ] ]
```

Out[ ]:= True

In order for farmers to benefit, ethanol demand must be more elastic

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru [ {  $\frac{d\text{Equilibrium}}{dx}$ , Equilibrium, InvSupply, signconditions, x == 0,
   $\frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} > \frac{d\text{subsidyamt}}{dx}$  },
   $\text{elasgap} > 0$  ]
```

Out[ ]:= True

With horizontal ethanol demand, farmers locally gain more than the treasury pays

In Figure I-2 of Chicago Price Theory, feed'[p] and s'[p] are finite, while eth'[p] == -∞, so that  $\frac{dp}{dx} == 1$  and elascond = True (in the neighborhood of x == 0).

```
In[ ]:= HorizontalEquilibrium = {eth + feed[p] == s[p], p == 1 + x};
```

```
In[ ]:= HorizontalSubsidyamt = x eth;
```

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[ {  $\frac{d\text{HorizontalEquilibrium}}{dx}$ , First@HorizontalEquilibrium,
  p == c'[s[p]], eth > 0, feed[p] > 0, (s'[p] == 0 & feed'[p] == 0) & x == 0 },
   $\frac{dfarmersurplus}{dx} > \frac{d\text{HorizontalSubsidyamt}}{dx} > 0$  ]
```

Out[ ]:= True

Note that the 1-for-1 pass-through rules out the case where the initial price is initially above the price that the ethanol-corn market will bear

### Global results: farmers gain and Treasury pays

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[ {  $\frac{d\text{Last@HorizontalEquilibrium}}{dx}$ ,
  First@HorizontalEquilibrium, p == c'[s[p]], eth > 0, feed[p] > 0 },
   $\frac{dfarmersurplus}{dx} > 0$  ]
```

Out[ ]:= True

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[ {  $\frac{d\text{HorizontalEquilibrium}}{dx}$ , eth > 0, feed'[p] ≤ 0, s'[p] ≥ 0, x > 0 },
   $\frac{d\text{HorizontalSubsidyamt}}{dx} > 0$  ]
```

Out[ ]:= True

### Not a global result without extra conditions

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[ {  $\frac{d\text{HorizontalEquilibrium}}{dx}$ , HorizontalEquilibrium, p == c'[s[p]],
  eth > 0, x > 0, signconditions[{{2, 3, 4, 6, 7}}], feed'[p] < 0 },
   $\frac{dfarmersurplus}{dx} > \frac{d\text{HorizontalSubsidyamt}}{dx}$  ]
```

Out[ ]:= True for some, False for others

```
In[ ]:= extracondition = x <  $\frac{\text{feed}[p]}{s'[p] - \text{feed}'[p]}$  ;
```

The old subsidy  $x$  has to be paid on the new supply  $s'[p] dx$ , but marginal supply gets no surplus. The old subsidy  $x$  has to be paid on quantity  $(-\text{feed}'[p] dx)$  reallocated from feed to ethanol, but this quantity was already getting paid by feed buyers and therefore yields no surplus to corn farmers. On the other hand, the extra subsidy  $dx$  translates to additional corn revenue from  $\text{feed}$  without a

subsidy expenditure.

```
In[ ]:= TheoryOverlap[ {  $\frac{d\text{HorizontalEquilibrium}}{dx}$ , HorizontalEquilibrium,
  p == c'[s[p]], eth > 0, x > 0, signconditions[{{2, 3, 4, 6, 7}}], feed'[p] < 0 },
  extracondition,
```

$$\frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} > \frac{d\text{HorizontalSubsidyamt}}{dx}$$

```
Out[ ]:= { x <  $\frac{\text{feed}(p)}{s'(p) - \text{feed}'(p)}$ , -s'(p)  $\frac{dp}{dx}$  c'(s(p)) + p s'(p)  $\frac{dp}{dx}$  + s(p)  $\frac{dp}{dx}$  > x  $\frac{d\text{eth}}{dx}$  + eth } are equivalent
```

```
In[ ]:= TheoryOverlap[ { First@HorizontalEquilibrium, eth > 0, x > 0, feed'[p] < 0 },
  extracondition,
```

$$x < \frac{s[p] - \text{eth}}{s'[p] - \text{feed}'[p]}$$

```
Out[ ]:= { x <  $\frac{\text{feed}(p)}{s'(p) - \text{feed}'(p)}$ , x <  $\frac{s(p) - \text{eth}}{s'(p) - \text{feed}'(p)}$  } are equivalent
```

## Inelastic supply has a simple demand-elasticity condition

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[ { Dt[Equilibrium, x], Equilibrium,
  signconditions, inelasticsupply, x == 0, elasconds0 },
   $\frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} > \frac{d\text{subsidyamt}}{dx} > 0$  ]
```

```
Out[ ]:= True
```

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[
  { Dt[Equilibrium, x], Equilibrium, signconditions, inelasticsupply, x == 0 },
  SameSign[  $\frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} - \frac{d\text{subsidyamt}}{dx}$ , elasgap ] &&
  SameSign[  $\frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} - \frac{d\text{subsidyamt}}{dx}$ , elasweight - 1 ] ]
```

```
Out[ ]:= True
```

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[
  { Dt[Equilibrium, x], Equilibrium, signconditions, inelasticsupply, x == 0 },
   $\frac{d\text{farmersurplus}}{dx} == s[p] \frac{dp}{dx}$  ]
```

```
Out[ ]:= True
```

## Inelastic ethanol demand

In[ ]:= Column@signconditions[[2 ;; 3]]

Out[ ]:=  $\text{feed}'[p] \leq 0$   
 $s'[p] \geq 0$

In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[{Dt[Equilibrium, x], signconditions[[2 ;; 3]], Not@inelasticsupply,  
 eth'[p - x] == 0},  
 $\frac{dp}{dx} == 0 == \frac{d \text{farmersurplus}}{dx}$ ]

Out[ ]:= True

## General formula for price impact

In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[Dt[Equilibrium, x],  
 $\frac{dp}{dx} == \text{qweight} \text{elasweight} \text{incidenceparam}$ ]

Out[ ]:= True

## Derivation

In[ ]:= First@Solve[Dt[Equilibrium, x], Dt[p, x]]

Out[ ]:=  $\left\{ Dt[p, x] \rightarrow \frac{\text{eth}'[p - x]}{\text{eth}'[p - x] + \text{feed}'[p] - s'[p]} \right\}$

In[ ]:= Column@{qweight, elasweight, incidenceparam}

Out[ ]:= 
$$\frac{\frac{\text{eth}[p-x]}{\text{eth}[p-x] + \text{feed}[p]} \cdot (\text{eth}[p-x] + \text{feed}[p]) \cdot \text{eth}'[p-x]}{\text{eth}[p-x] (\text{eth}'[p-x] + \text{feed}'[p]) \cdot \frac{\text{eth}'[p-x] + \text{feed}'[p]}{\text{eth}'[p-x] + \text{feed}'[p] - s'[p]}}$$

## Residual supply curve

In[ ]:= resids[p\_] = s[p] - eth[p - x];

In[ ]:= TheoryOverlap[{}, Equilibrium, feed[p] == resids[p]]

Out[ ]:=  $\{s(p) = \text{eth}(p - x) + \text{feed}(p), s(p) - \text{eth}(p - x) = \text{feed}(p)\}$  are equivalent

## The ethanol subsidy rate $x$ shifts supply in the feed market

```
In[ ]:= TheoryGuru[First@signconditions,  
  D[resids[p], x] < 0]
```

```
Out[ ]:= True
```

The more elastic is ethanol demand, the more elastic is supply to the feed market

```
In[ ]:= resids'[p]
```

```
Out[ ]:= -eth'[p - x] + s'[p]
```

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## Variable interpretations