International Conflict

TheoryGuru applications

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Load Economicreasoning package only if it is not already loaded

If[Length@Names["PLTools`*"] < 10, Get["http://economicreasoning.com"]]

Notes

Attack and Disarm are the only two actions. *R*, *S*, and *T* are scalar payoff parameters, with the attack-attack payoff normalized to 0. Notation from here.

Setup

```
Attack = 1; Disarm = 0;
equilibrium[{country1_, country2_}] =
  (* country 1 sees no benefit from deviating *)
  payoff[{country1, country2}] ≥ payoff[{1 - country1, country2}] &&
  (* country 2 sees no benefit from deviating *)
  payoff[{country2, country1}] ≥ payoff[{1 - country2, country1}];
payoff[{us_, them_}] = {1 - us, us}. (<sup>R</sup> S
  T 0).{1 - them, them};
AttackAttackistheUniqueEquilibrium = equilibrium@{Attack, Attack} &&
```

Not@equilibrium@{Disarm, Attack} && Not@equilibrium@{Attack, Disarm} && Not@equilibrium@{Disarm, Disarm}; TwoEquilibria = equilibrium@{Attack, Attack} && equilibrium@{Disarm, Disarm} && Not@equilibrium@{Disarm, Attack} && Not@equilibrium@{Attack, Disarm};

Results

Result 1: with T > R > 0 > S, the only (Nash) equilibrium is for both sides to attack.

```
TheoryGuru[T > R > 0 > S,
   AttackAttackistheUniqueEquilibrium]
True
```

Result 2: The necessary and sufficient condition for this equilibrium to be unique are T > R && S < 0.

TheoryOverlap[{}, T > R && S < 0, AttackAttackistheUniqueEquilibrium] $\{T > R \land S < 0, (0 \ge S \land R < T \land S < 0) \lor (0 \ge S \land R < T \land T < R)\}$ are equivalent

Result 3: If T ≤ R instead, is is also an equilibrium for both sides to disarm

```
TheoryGuru[T ≤ R && S < 0,
TwoEquilibria]
True
```

Variable interpretations

Show the payoff matrix

```
allfeasiblepairs = Tuples[{Attack, Disarm}, 2];
payoffmatrix = Map[payoff, {#, Reverse@#} & /@ allfeasiblepairs, {2}] ~ Partition~2;
coloredpayoffmatrix = Map[Grid[{Riffle[#, ","]}, Spacings → 0] &,
    MapAt[Style[#, Red] &,
    MapAt[Style[#, Blue] &, payoffmatrix, {All, All, 1}], {All, All, 2}], {2}];
    Them
    Attack Disarm
Us Attack 0,0 T,S
Disarm S,T R,R
```